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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of lJtah 
ROS ID KLAFT A, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ALBER'I' N. SMITH, dba OX RANCH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF 
Counsel for Appellant desires to comment very 
briefly by way of a reply to Respondent's argument. 
POINT I. Nature of This Action. Respondent 
argued in his brief and also in his oral argument that 
this is not a negligence action. We quote from his brief, 
page 2.3: "This was not a negligence action. It was a 
~tatutory liability action." Page 26: "Each time the 
matter was viewed as some hybrid type of negligence 
action." I confess I do not understand counsel's po-
sition. Every case which I have examined, including 
all of the <le('isions from this Court, refer to a violation 
of a statntf:l as negliqence an<l then discuss the question 
whether s11ch negligence constitutes negligence per fe 
or creates a presumption of negligence whidt ealb fur 
an explanation by way of justification or excuse. 
POINT II. Comment on Section :27-1-3-J., ll.l'.\. 
1953. Counsel for Re::;pondent referred to Sertion ~; 
1-34. He contends that this ::;tatute gives to the injnrf·il 
party the absolute right to recover damages urrnn th1 
mere proof that the cow in question escaped fron1 the 
cattle rack. vVe quote from Berkovitz i·. A111eriro11 
River Gravel Co., 215 Pac. 675, decided by the Supreme 
Court of California, which we cited in om openi11c 
brief at page 16 and which appears to be the landrnarK 
case in California, on page 677 as follows: 
"If some good excuse appears which woulrl lir> a 
sufficient defense to an action for the rwnaln 
imposed by the law ... then the law is not mil: 
violated. We find few cases in which this is clmly 
stated but they deserve to take prcePdem·i> 11: 
all others as they reconcile the principle upon 
which the other cases were actually decided." 
This makes good sense. The statute say~: ''Anr 
person violating any provisions of this chapter . · · 
shall he liable for all damages that may accrue to th• 
party damaged by reason of such violation." If the 
appellant is allowed to present facts wltich ilw jun 
finds sufficient to justify or excuse his actions. the11 
he has not violated the statute which is based upon a 
violation thereof. 
POINT III. Negligence of Richard Klafta Being 
the Sole Proximate Cam;e of the Accident. ronm;rl frn 
2 
Respondent cites and quotes from the case of Nyman 
r. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P. 2d 1114, as authority 
fur their contention that the negligence of Richard 
Klaftn was at most a concurring cause of the accident. 
We think that thi:-; case does not support Respondent's 
l'lllltcntion, hut rather supports Appellant's position. 
This ease was tried to the court without a jury. Both 
plaintiff and defendant offered evidence in support of 
their relativ0 positions. The trial court made findings 
of faet in favor of plaintiff to the effect that defendant 
Cedar Cit~' was negligent and that the concurring negli-
g-enee of \\Talton (the driver of the car in which plain-
tiff 1rns riding) did not hreak the chain of causation and 
that Crdar City was not relieved of its negligence. The 
defendant appealed to this court, contending that the 
finding of faet did not support the judgment. This 
court held, however, that the finding was supported 
b)· the evidence and sustained the judgment. Appellant 
does not eontend that the evidence would justify the 
court in holding as a matter of law that the negligence 
of Ridianl Klafta was the sole proximate cause of the 
aecident. What Appellant does contend is that on the 
retrial of this ease Appellant should he granted the 
right to offer the evidence or any other evidence hear-
ing upon Klafta's alleged negligence and submit the 
is~ue to the jury under proper instructions. The lower 
court h~· its order has now withdrawn this issue from 
the jury. 'T'he question, therefore, is whether there 
wus suffieient evidence to suhrnit to the jury the quest-
ion of whether or not Richard Klafta was negligent 
and that ~nd1 negligenee was the sole proximate cause 
11 f the ae<'ident. We have eovered this question in our 
opening hrief. However, we cite a recent Utah cair 
which we think is applicable. 'l'hat is Cliarcoz, Ad- 1 
ministratur, i'. Cotlre11, 12 Utah 2d 25, 3Gl P. 2d :J16, 
which adopts the rnk', nniversally applied, that "if 
there is a conflict in the eYidence, the question of negli-
gence is not one of law hut one of fact to he <leterminl'rl 
by the jury. However, even if the facts are undisputed, 
if fair-rnind0d men can honestly draw different con 
clusions from them, the issue of negligence shonld !JP 
settled by a jury. In other words, negligence is a quest-
ion for the jury unless all reasonable men must draw thP 1 
same conclusions from the facts as the:.· are Fhown.'' 1 
It is true thatKlafta and his mother both testified that 
he was going about 50 miles per hour. However, on 
this point we quote from the case of Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 
123 Utah 281, 259 P. 2d 294, as follows: 
"All of thP direct evidence on the circumstances 
surrounding the accident comes from the driver 
of the taxicab, who is an interE>stPd witnei' 
whose testimony may reasonably he disconntPd 
... also the driver's testimony that he was onh-
traveling from 20 to 25 miles per hour." 
We submit that the jury could well find from the evi-
dence which was offered in the trial below as to physical 
evidence of excessive speed that he was traveling greatly 
m excess of 50 miles per hour. 
POINT IV. Neiman v. Grand Central Markets Dis-
tinguished. Respondent relies upon the case of Neiman 
v. Grand Central Markets, 9 Utah 2d 46, 337 P. 2d 424, 
as being determinative of the question as to whether 
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yiolation of a :;tatute relating to traffic on the high-
\\'aY establishes negligence per se. The case at bar is 
dst.inguishahle from the Neiman case. The facts in 
thr Neiman case bring it within the doctrine announced 
in the Skerl 1·. Willow Creek and Smith v. Mine and 
Smelter cases. (See discussion by Mr. Justice Crockett 
in the Tompson case.) It is interesting to note that 
the doctrine relative to violation of traffic statutes 
has bern strictly adhered to by Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, yet it has held "That sale of adulterated food 
by dealer in violation of statute was made by employee 
of rlealer without dealer's personal knowledge or im-
mediatP direction did not constitute a defense to prose-
cution for sale of adulterated food, since duty placed on 
dealer by statute prohibiting sale of such food is abso-
lute within limits of dealer's control." People v. Schwartz, 
iO I'. 2d 1017. 
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